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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
EXTRACTS FROM THE 1963 ANNUAL REPORT OF
SIR WILLIAM HILDRED, DIRECTOR GENERAL
Equipment and Capacity
Without doubt, the most notable development in the air transport industry
in recent years has been the re-equipment program. It is the largest the airlines
have ever undertaken; its impact has reverberated throughout the whole structure.
It has resulted in massive increases in long-term debt, the size of interest payments,
the cost of obsolescence and depreciation, and has affected operating costs and
the amount of capacity available. Every airline has felt its impact.
According to the latest figures, IATA members alone have ordered about 1,100
pure jets, of which approximately 800 have already been delivered. These 1,100jets represent more than a third of the present IATA member operating fleet;
but more significant is the fact that their original cost of more than 5,500 million
United States dollars and their potential capacity are much greater than the rest of
the fleet put together. Jet orders continued to grow during the past year or so and I
understand that several hundred additional orders are expected in the next few
years as replacement equipment for shorter routes.
Up to 1958, speeds and carrying capacities had increased steadily, but then
came the great leap brought about by the turbo-jet. This strongly emphasized
the trend towards smaller numbers of larger and faster aircraft, offering higher
capacity and potentially lower costs of operation. As a result of this emphasis on
larger aircraft, the size of the fleet began a slow decline to 3,161 through 1960
to 1962, after hitting a peak of 3,479 in 1959. At the same time, we saw the
share of four-engined aircraft in the fleet total increase from fifty-one per cent
in 1957 to sixty-two per cent in 1962. The operation of increasing numbers of
larger and faster aircraft also made itself felt in the average number of seats per
aircraft in scheduled service which arose from 51.3 in 1957 to 81.6 seats in 1962,
and average block speeds which moved from 216 mph to 292 mph. Both averages
continue to grow.
Another development we have noticed in this re-equipment period is the way
in which turbine-powered aircraft, particularly the pure jets, have dramatically
accelerated the obsolescence of piston aircraft. A total of 1,146 piston aircraft have
moved out of the fleet in five years. At the same time, 1,154 turbine aircraft, 702jets and 452 turbo-props have moved in. In 1957, ninety-three per cent of the fleet
was piston-powered; by the end of last year, this had dropped to fifty-seven per
cent. But more than half of the present payload offering is provided by jets:
piston aircraft account for less than twenty-five per cent. As the jets on order
are delivered, and more and more of the older aircraft are retired, the higher
capacity jets will account for an even greater share of the airlines' available
capacity. More and more airline fleets are becoming fully turbine powered; some
airlines operate jets only.
At the end of 1962, the operating fleet of IATA members numbered 3,161
aircraft, consisting of 705 pure jets, 627 turbo-props, 1,801 piston-engined air-
craft and twenty-eight helicopters.
The public have been quick to accept the jets and to show their preferences for
using them. Their speed, increased comfort and interior quietness have strong
passenger appeal; their ability to reduce travel times has done much to extend the
scope of travel and tourism. To the businessman, the tourist or the government
INTERNATIONAL
official with limited time, they are very attractive.
From an airline point of view they have fulfilled their promise and there is no
doubt that their introduction has been successful. However, there is one character-
istic of these aircraft that has caused problems for the industry and that is their
astonishing potential productivity. Every time a jet replaces a piston aircraft at
least double the capacity is added. And so capacity increases even if flight fre-
quencies do not. But frequencies have increased on many routes, particularly on
those where competition is keenest. So the addition of 1,100 assorted jets repre-
sents an incredibly massive injection of capacity.
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that a problem of excess capacity has been
associated with this extensive re-equipment by the airlines. By 1961, we were
stunned by an oversurplus. Traffic was unable to keep up with the capacity being
offered on world routes. In 1962 the airlines were offering eighty-six per cent more
capacity than in 1957; but traffic had increased by only sixty-four per cent. A
total of 29,720 million tonne-kilometres of capacity were placed on air routes
but were matched with only 15,100 million tonne-kilometres of traffic. The
result was obvious-lower load factors. By last year, these had reached the lowest
level in the entire post-war period. The average scheduled passenger load factor
had dropped almost eight points from 61.2 per cent in 1957 to 53.4 per cent; the
average weight load factor dropped 6.6 points from 57.4 per cent to 50.8 per
cent. We must not overlook the importance of each load factor point. In 1962,
one of these points was worth about 118 million United States dollars to the indus-
try. At that rate, it takes only three or four points to make the difference between
profit and loss. Higher load factors are therefore the prerequisite to any intelligent
solution to the industry's current financial problems.
The heaviest effects have been naturally felt in the international sector. On
the most important international route-the North Atlantic-the average load
factor dropped resoundingly in 1961 from a satisfactory level of 64.2 per cent
in 1960 to 51.2 per cent-a thirteen point drop, a proper clanger. Despite im-
proved traffic growth in 1962 it only crept up less than half a point. But far
from stopping there, the average load factor for the first six months of this year
has dropped still further to forty-five per cent. Passenger traffic increased by only
five per cent.
How much capacity is provided is not my concern-nor the concern of IATA
within its constitutional functions. But as an interested observer I am most con-
cerned. I find it amazing to read of carriers intending to increase their North
Atlantic frequencies by twenty to forty per cent this year when there is already
too much total capacity being provided. One cannot but begin to wonder whether
they look at the figures. If there is a good explanation for it I would like to hear
it. One might also ask whether some of these additional flights are to be flown
as blocked off charters and, if so, how many?
Some of the reduction in load factors is due to the decline in North Atlantic
first-class traffic. Not only has its share of scheduled traffic dropped from 23.6
per cent in 1957 to 9.2 per cent in 1962; but in absolute amounts it stands at
only two-thirds of its 1960 level with 208,000 first-class passengers. First-class
dropped twenty per cent in 1961 and fifteen per cent in 1962. This has played
havoc with the first-class load factor, which dropped twenty points from 52.7
per cent in 1960 to 32.3 per cent in 1962. Declining first-class traffic is there-
fore part of the problem and bears watching. Although the decline in first-class
is particularly noticeable on the North Atlantic, it is symptomatic of a trend in
the industry in general.
Excess capacity must be seen in proper perspective. The nature of the jet, and
the fact that its superiority over older aircraft is so great that co-existence on the
same routes is often impossible, means that the changeover, once decided upon,
must be complete. The airlines have taken on the capacity expansion of a decade
in a matter of months. Their avowed intention is to grow up into this capacity,
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like the growing boy wearing his father's jacket. But it is typical of the age of
affluence. No city builds an airport just the right size for today's traffic; no
architect today builds a new building on an old site the same size; they look
years ahead and provide excess capacity in the hope of filling it sooner or later.
But right now we are suffering financially.
It is now generally recognized that the jets are capable of operating at lower
ton-mile or seat-mile costs. Some years ago, there was a good deal of controversy
over this. Obviously operating costs vary a good deal even for the same aircraft
and depend on a variety of factors which I shall not go into now. The point is
that the jets' lower seat-mile costs can only be realized with high utilization.
Any aircraft needs to be operated at a reasonable rate of utilization, but operat-
ing these large and high capacity jets at reasonable rates of utilization or merely
replacing flights flown by older aircraft, means making available much more
capacity on air routes. It is not until this capacity is filled past its breakeven load
factor that an aircraft can become profitable to operate, no matter how economical
it is. High utilization and economic load factors are the two essential ingredients
to profitable operation. One without the other is not enough. Utilization rates are
going up at a satisfactory level. But, as I mentioned earlier, the traffic of many
airlines has not increased fast enough to provide sufficiently high load factors to
enable the jets in their fleet to earn a profit. Not yet, hence our present troubles
with excess capacity. I think the time has come to take a long hard look at the
load factor problem and to make a serious attempt to bring capacity utilization
back above sixty per cent. Low load factors and their poor financial return are
a major stumbling block to lower fares.
The Years Ahead
What of the future growth of air transport? I think the prospects are good.
At the end of last year, I forecast that, all being well, the airlines should in 1963
carry about 136 million passengers and perform 148,000 million passenger
kilometres and 3,540 million cargo tonne-kilometres. I still think these totals will
be realized. Further ahead, the forecasters expect the growth of air travel to tend
to level off, whatever the airlines do. It is evident that we cannot expect passenger
traffic to grow indefinitely at a level of fifteen per cent. As the base grows in
size, the same percentage growth represents greater and greater volume. ICAO
passenger traffic forecasts have assumed an average annual rate of growth at nine
per cent up to 1967, reaching 190,000 million passenger kilometres; then an
annual average increase of five per cent to 1970, with 220,000 million passenger
kilometres; and then an average annual growth rate of 4.4 per cent, reaching
250,000 million passenger kilometres in 1973. This represents almost twice the
1962 traffic total. But we must not lose sight of the fact that much less than
five per cent of the 3,000 million people living in the world today travel by air.
Present traffic (passenger, cargo and mail) is a mere drop in the bucket. The
traffic potential is immense and I continue to believe that drastically reduced
fares would draw many millions of new passengers to air transport and vastly
supersede these forecasts.
What can the airlines do in coming years to bring air transport within the
means of vastly greater numbers of the world's population? They can only make
substantial reductions in fares once again when they have reached the economic
position that will support such a move. Concerted efforts are being directed towards
improved operating efficiency, increased load factors, with the objective of im-
proving financial positions. But, at the same time, the airlines cannot forget their
obligations with regard to safety and-profits or no profits-they will continue to
spend time, money and research on every conceivable project that will ensure it.
We have not seen the end of the merging, pooling, cooperation, shotgun weddings
and cost cutting that characterize the industry today. Technological innovations
and improvements have played a significant role and will continue to do so.
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Electronic computers and reservations systems, better ground equipment and
facilities will assist the speedy handling of growing traffic volumes. But low
fares are the key to any really massive future expansion of the industry; the
problem is one of achieving much lower fares with a small margin of profit.
This is our objective.
